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Abstract
We examine corporate restructuring following privatization using uncommonly rich
data on the population of Portuguese rms from 1991-2009. We nd that privatization
leads to sizable job losses, reecting reductions in both the number of establishments
and in the number of workers per establishment. We nd no robust evidence of impacts
on the structure of the workforce. The estimated job losses following privatization are
consistent with a theory in which the shift in ownership increases the degree of prot
orientation and leads to lower job security.
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1 Introduction
The privatization of state-owned enterprises is often advocated on the grounds that the
implied ownership shift triggers a process of corporate restructuring that leads to a more ef-
cient use of productive resources.1 Yet empirical evidence on such a restructuring process
is relatively scarce, and most previous research faces important data limitations (Brown
et al., 2010). We examine corporate restructuring following privatization using unusually
rich data covering the population of Portuguese rms in the 1991-2009 period, when the
country adopted an ambitious and broad-based privatization program. We provide theory
and evidence that privatization leads to sizable job losses. Perhaps surprisingly, we nd no
robust evidence of impacts on the structure of the workforce. As privatization programs
continue to feature prominently in the policy agenda of many nations across the globe,
our ndings shed new light on whether and how they will contribute to the structural
transformation of the corresponding economies.
We draw on a comprehensive administrative worker-rm data set spanning almost two
decades. This data set provides information on the share of state-owned capital in each
year and allows us to follow rms over time. It further enables us to decompose em-
ployment changes that are due to shifts in the number of establishments and in average
establishment size. Using detailed worker-level records, we compute entry and exit rates,
and a wide array of measures of the composition of the workforce within each rm. Specif-
ically, we build average measures of worker tenure, age and schooling; skill-measures based
on worker occupations; and the share of male employees.
To estimate the impacts of privatization on each of these measures, we rst adopt a
di¤erence-in-di¤erences type approach. We examine both the universe of rms and the
sub-group that recorded ownership shifts during the period of analysis.2 We consider two
di¤erent denitions of private ownership: the 50% cuto¤ of private capital and the initial
tranche of privatization. To get a sense about the extent to which our results might be
driven by selection bias, we use an alternative and arguably preferable estimator namely
propensity score matching combined with the rm xed-e¤ects estimator, in the spirit
of Blundell and Costa Dias (2000) and others. The main nding that emerges from the
econometric analysis is that privatization leads to sizable job losses. The drop in employ-
ment within privatized rms reects both reductions in the number of establishments and
1For example, the privatization programs of Greece and Portugal are a agship in the agenda for
structural transformation of these economies under the EU/IMF economic and nancial assistance pro-
grams. The literature on privatization and e¢ ciency includes Haskel and Sanchis (1995), La Porta and
López-de-Silanes (1999) and Brown et al. (2006).
2 In the latter case, identication is therefore solely based on di¤erences in the timing of the ownership
change.
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less employees per establishment. We nd no robust evidence of signicant impacts of pri-
vatization on the average age, gender and skill composition of the workforce, as measured
by the aforementioned indicators.
To help interpret our main empirical nding, we outline a theory of corporate ownership
and employment determination, drawing on Monteiro et al. (2011) and Bastos et al.
(2011). In the model, the ownership regime inuences the rms objective function: private
rms maximize prots, while public rms also take consumerswelfare into account. In
addition, the degree of job security is higher in public than in private rms. By making
the rm more prot oriented, privatization implies that the rm nds it optimal to reduce
output in order to achieve a higher market price and thereby increase prots. This output
decline leads, all else equal, to a downsizing of the labor force. At the same time, by
making jobs less secure, privatization induces greater worker e¤ort. While this increase in
e¤ort reduces the e¤ective wage rate, which tends to raise labor demand, it also means that
a given output can be produced with fewer workers, which has the opposite e¤ect. The
fall in job security following privatization will contribute to reduce employment further if
labor demand is su¢ ciently inelastic.
This paper builds on and contributes to the literature on the employment e¤ects of
privatization. The general picture emerging from this literature is mixed. In a study for the
UK, Haskel and Szymanski (1993) examine data on 14 privatized companies over 1972-1988
and nd that employment fell following the change to more commercial objectives. Bhaskar
and Kahn (1995) use information on 31 privatized rms from jute mills in Bangladesh and
nd that privatization led to sizable employment losses. Drawing on rich rm-level panel
data for Hungary, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine, Brown et al. (2010) conclude that the
results in all 4 countries consistently reject the hypothesis that privatization induces job
losses. Using uncommonly rich panel data on the universe of Portuguese rms, we not
only provide further evidence on how privatization impacts on overall employment levels,
but also estimate e¤ects on a wide range of indicators on the structure of employment,
thereby providing a more comprehensive picture of the process of corporate restructuring
following privatization.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data employed, before Section 3
provides context on the Portuguese privatization program. Section 4 discusses economet-
ric issues and presents the empirical strategy. Section 5 presents the econometric results
and examines their robustness. Section 6 presents a theoretical model of corporate re-
structuring following privatization to help interpret our main results. Section 7 concludes
the paper.
3
2 Data
We draw on data from Quadros de Pessoal for the 1991-2009 period. This data set is an
administrative census of the population of rms, their establishments and their workers
in the Portuguese corporate sector. It also has information on the collective agreements
that cover the workforce. The records of Quadros de Pessoal are collected yearly by the
Ministry of Employment and participation is compulsory for every rm with wage earners.
These same administrative records are used by the Ministry of Employment for checking
the rms compliance with labor law, and must be made available to every worker in a
public place of the establishment. The information is generally considered to be highly
reliable.
Firms report information on their attributes and those of each employee. The rm
records include information on the number of employees, number of establishments, in-
dustry code, geographical location, and percentage of capital that is owned by the state and
by foreign investors. The set of worker attributes includes monthly wages, gender, school-
ing, date of starting, occupation and hours worked. The data also include information
on the type of contract that covers the workforce (sectoral, multi-rm, rm, mandatory
regime). In each year, the worker data can be linked to each establishment and to the
rm.3
Using the individual worker les we construct rm-level measures of worker entry and
exit rates. The worker entry rate of a rm (in a given year) is measured by the ratio
between the number of worker accessions and total employment in the rm, where the
number of accessions in a given year is measured by the number of workers with tenure
below 1 year. Similarly, the worker exit rate is dened as the ratio between the number
of worker separations and total employment, where the number of separations in a rm
(in a given year t) is measured by the number of workers that are present at time t but
absent at time t+1. We further build a wide range of yearly measures of the structure of
employment within rms. In particular, we construct average measures of worker tenure,
age and schooling; skill-measures based on workers occupation; and the proportion of
male employees.4
3Worker data for 2001 were not collected by the Ministry of Employment and hence this year is excluded
from the analysis.
4Quadros de Pessoal makes it possible to construct occupational categories based on the 1988 Inter-
national Standard Classication of Occupations (ISCO-88). This classication allows us to dene four
skill-levels which are based on: i) the level of general education required to perform a job, and ii) the job-
related formal training required to perform a job (ILO, 1990). See Appendix A for a detailed description
of this classication. We dene high-skill occupations as those falling under "Skill level 4".
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics
All rms Firms that change ownership
Variables Mean Observations Mean Observations
Private ownership .998 2,176,207 .648 5,948
(.047) (.478)
Total employment (log) 1.888 2,176,207 3.457 5,948
(1.091) (1.837)
Number of establishments (log) .093 2,176,207 .586 5,948
(.347) (1.119)
Establishment size (log) 1.794 2,176,207 2.871 5,948
(1.017) (1.374)
Entry rate .091 2,176,207 .063 5,948
(.176) (.123)
Exit rate .109 2,176,207 .109 5,948
(.205) (.191)
Tenure (log) 1.383 1,965,412 1.813 5,761
(.967) (.990)
Age (log) 3.579 2,176,207 3.658 5,948
(.245) (.184)
Share of males .579 2,176,207 .600 5,948
(.410) (.321)
Schooling>12 .055 2,176,207 .203 5,948
(.184) (.279)
Schooling years (log) 1.804 2,169,419 2.103 5,946
(.405) (.402)
Share of skilled workers .136 2,176,207 .107 5,948
(.268) (.191)
Firm-level bargaining .001 2,176,207 .106 5,948
(.031) (.306)
Multi-rm bargaining .003 2,176,207 .065 5,948
(.054) (.245)
Sectoral bargaining .876 2,176,207 .488 5,948
(.326) (.496)
Mandatory bargaining .089 2,176,207 .180 5,948
(.282) (.379)
Labor productivity (log) 10.782 1,998,919 11.219 5,192
(1.099) (1.565)
Sales (log) 12.697 1,998,919 14.751 5,192
(1.561) (2.524)
Monthly wage (log) 6.467 2,176,207 7.083 5,948
(.429) (.574)
Notes: Standard deviation in parentheses. Labor productivity, sales and monthly wages are expressed in
real terms (prices = 2009), using the GDP deator for the rst two variables and the CPI for the third.
Table 1 provides summary statistics on the resulting rm-level panel data. They reveal
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a number of interesting stylized facts on both the population of Portuguese rms and the
sub-sample of rms that observed ownership changes during the period of analysis. In
particular, rms in this latter group tend to be larger (both in terms of employment
levels, number of establishments and total sales), more productive and pay higher wages.
In addition, they typically have lower entry rates, higher average tenure, and a more
educated workforce (although they have a smaller share of workers performing high-skill
occupations).
3 The privatization program
Beginning in the 1990s, Portugal implemented one of the most comprehensive privatization
programs in the OECD area (OECD, 2001). Taking into account the size of the economy,
Portugal is in fact the largest privatizer in the enlarged European Union, with total pri-
vatization revenues of about 14% of GDP over the period 1977-2003. The privatization
program comprised a large number of rms covering almost all industries.5 While the
program initially targeted mainly nancial sector corporations, it later covered rms from
other services and manufacturing. The bulk of the program was achieved by 1999 with a
peak in 1997. The pace of reform has slowed down considerably thereafter with few major
rms being privatized between 2000 and 2009. The process has recently regained some
momentum under the 2011-2014 EU/IMF economic and nancial assistance program. But
by then the state had already withdrawn its presence in most sectors, such as brewery,
paper and pulp, cement, oil and highways.
According to Quadros de Pessoal, between 1991 and 2009 a total of 313 rms were
transferred from public to private control (dened as private capital above 50%). The
restructuring process further implied that a non-negligible number of rms were transferred
from private to public control, while others experienced more than one ownership change
during the period of analysis.6 In our data set, these two categories amount to 153 and
115 rms, respectively.
4 Empirical strategy
We aim to estimate the causal impacts of private versus public ownership on a wide range
of indicators of corporate restructuring. We begin with a standard xed-e¤ects method
5See Bastos et al. (2011) for further institutional details on the Portuguese privatization program.
6Although there was no nationalization program in place during the period of analysis, the restructuring
process sometimes led to newly privatized rms being acquired by existing public rms in the same industry.
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using the panel structure of the data set as follows:
Yit = Privateit + Xit + i + r + k +  t + it; (1)
where Yit is the outcome of interest for rm i in year t, and Privateit is a dummy variable
that takes the value of one when the rm has private ownership and zero otherwise. The
set of regressors further includes: Xit, a vector of rm attributes; i, a rm xed-e¤ect;
r, a region e¤ect; k, an industry xed-e¤ect;  t, a year e¤ect; and, nally, it, an exoge-
nous disturbance. The rm xed-e¤ects absorb the impacts on Yit of any time-invariant
unobserved rm characteristics. The estimated parameter  is therefore a measure of the
di¤erential behavior of outcome Y after the ownership change, stripping out the role of
such time-invariant heterogeneity. In some specications, we will include as well industry-
specic time trends to account for the role of idiosyncratic shocks at the sector-level.
A critical issue in examining corporate restructuring due to ownership shifts is how to
account for selection bias. The rm xed-e¤ects approach described above accounts for
selection based on time-invariant rm characteristics (e.g., initial revenues or productiv-
ity). We further apply the xed-e¤ects estimator on the sub-sample of rms that observed
ownership changes during the period of analysis. In this case, identication of the e¤ects
of interest is solely based on di¤erences in the timing of the ownership shift, which may
plausibly be uncorrelated with changes in Y . However, time-varying rm attributes may
impact on privatization decisions di¤erentially. In particular, selection into privatization
may be driven by lagged rm attributes that could be correlated with the indicators of
corporate restructuring we consider. To deal with this issue, we adopt a combination of
propensity score matching and the xed-e¤ects estimator, in the spirit of Blundell and
Costa Dias (2000) and others.7 The propensity score matching technique allows us to
control for the selection bias by restricting the comparison to di¤erences within carefully
chosen rm pairs that are characterized by similar observable pre-privatization character-
istics and trends. The aim of this technique is to build the unobservable counterfactual
on how privatized plants would have behaved had they remained state-owned. The un-
derlying assumption is that conditional on observable rm attributes that are relevant
for the privatization decision, potential outcomes for treated (privatized) and non-treated
(non-privatized) rms are orthogonal to treatment status.
In our application, the propensity score is the predicted probability of a rm being
privatized. We estimate this probability using a logit model, drawing on pre-treatment
7Related applications using rm-level data include, among many others, Conyon et al. (2002), Girma
and Görg (2007), Heyman et al. (2007), Arnold and Javorcik (2009) and Guadalupe et al. (2012).
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observations for privatized rms. A rm falls in the control group if it has some public
capital but does not experience any ownership change over the period of analysis. To match
treated and control rms, we use the Mahalabonis distance in two variables: estimated
propensity score and year. The former variable ensures that treated rms are matched with
control-group rms with similar pre-treatment observable characteristics and trends, while
the latter ensures that observations for each treatment-control pair belong to the same
year. The matched sample is composed of all treated rms and corresponding (nearest)
control rms. Observations referring the latter group are weighted by the total number
of times the same rm is used as control. We then apply the standard rm xed-e¤ects
method described above on this balanced sample.
5 Results
5.1 Fixed-e¤ects estimates
In Tables 2 to 5, we report the xed-e¤ects estimates of the e¤ects of privatization on
the various indicators of corporate restructuring we consider. All regressions include the
dummy variables for collective agreement, industry, region and year. The upper panel in
each table considers the population of rms, while the lower panel considers only rms
that changed ownership during the period of analysis. For each outcome considered, we
report results with and without industry trends.
The results in column (1) and (2) of Table 2 suggest that privatization leads to sizable
job losses. The estimated e¤ect is at about 22-23% when using the full sample, and
falls to 13%-16% when we exploit only the timing of privatization to identify the e¤ect of
interest. Changes in rm-level employment can be decomposed into changes in the number
of establishments and in average establishment size. Since OLS is a linear operator, the
regressions reported in columns (3) to (6) additively decompose the employment e¤ects of
privatization on each of these margins. They suggest that most employment losses are due
to a decline in the average establishment size, although we also tend to observe a negative
and signicant impact on the number of establishments.8
8Further results (not reported but available upon request) suggest that privatization leads to a signif-
icant fall in the total number of reported working hours within the rm, as would be expected.
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Table 2. Private ownership and size
Total Number of Establishment
employment (log) establishments (log) size (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: All rms
Private ownership -.215 -.228 -.067 -.069 -.149 -.159
(.045) (.045) (.026) (.025) (.034) (.033)
Adjusted R2 .872 .873 .748 .745 .857 .858
Observations 2,176,207 2,176,207 2,176,207
Panel B: Firms that change ownership
Private ownership -.162 -.126 -.041 -.021 -.121 -.105
(.038) (.036) (.020) (.021) (.032) (.030)
Adjusted R2 .900 .906 .892 .897 .859 .864
Observations 5,948 5,948 5,948
Industry trends no yes no yes no yes
Notes: Signicance levels:  : 10%  : 5%  : 1%. Each column reports the coe¢ cient for
private ownership obtained separately in a regression for each dependent variable. Private ownership
is an indicator variable that equals one if the rm has at least 50 percent private ownership. All
columns control for four wage bargaining regimes and include rm, year, industry and region xed
e¤ects. Standard errors are clustered by rm.
In Table 3 we look at e¤ects of ownership changes on entry and exit rates. The results
suggest that job losses reported earlier are mainly driven by higher exit rates. In Tables
4 and 5, we examine whether and how privatization is followed by signicant changes in
the structure of the workforce. Given the evidence pointing to job losses, it is particularly
important to examine the extent to which these might be associated with changes in the
structure of employment. We look at impacts on average measures of worker tenure, age
and schooling; skill-measures based on worker occupations; and the proportion of male
employees. Consistent with the impacts reported earlier on job losses and exit rates,
we nd a statistically signicant decline in average worker tenure. Perhaps surprisingly,
however, the results do not show robust evidence of signicant impacts on the measures
of age, gender, and skill composition of the workforce.
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Table 3. Private ownership and worker ows
Entry rate Exit rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: All rms
Private ownership .009 .010 .012 .011
(.005) (.005) (.006) (.006)
Adjusted R2 .258 .259 .336 .337
Observations 2,176,207 2,176,207
Panel B: Firms that change ownership
Private ownership .004 .003 .012 .012
(.006) (.006) (.006) (.006)
Adjusted R2 .204 .206 .421 .423
Observations 5,948 5,948
Industry trends no yes no yes
Notes: Signicance levels:  : 10%  : 5%  : 1%.
Each column reports the coe¢ cient for private ownership ob-
tained separately in a regression for each dependent variable.
Private ownership is an indicator variable that equals one
if the rm has at least 50 percent private ownership. All
columns control for four wage bargaining regimes and in-
clude rm, year, industry and region xed e¤ects. Standard
errors are clustered by rm.
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Table 4. Private ownership and worker attributes
Tenure (log) Age (log) Share of males
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: All rms
Private ownership -156 -.153 -.018 -.015 -.006 -.005
(.034) (.034) (.007) (.006) (.009) (.009)
Adjusted R2 .719 .721 .681 .683 .807 .807
Observations 1,965,412 2,176,207 2,176,207
Panel B: Firms that change ownership
Private ownership -.109 -.091 -.005 -.005 -.013 -.010
(.032) (.032) (.006) (.006) (.008) (.009)
Adjusted R2 .778 .785 .713 .718 .783 .785
Observations 5,761 5,948 5,948
Industry trends no yes no yes no yes
Notes: Signicance levels:  : 10%  : 5%    : 1%. Each column reports
the coe¢ cient for private ownership obtained separately in a regression for each dependent
variable. Private ownership is an indicator variable that equals one if the rm has at least 50
percent private ownership. All columns control for four wage bargaining regimes and include
rm, year, industry and region xed e¤ects. Standard errors are clustered by rm.
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Table 5. Private ownership and education
Schooling > 12 Schooling Share of
years (log) skilled workers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: All rms
Private ownership .004 .004 .008 .006 .003 .002
(.009) (.009) (.009) (.009) (.007) (.007)
Adjusted R2 .706 .708 .778 .779 .534 .540
Observations 2,176,207 2,169,419 2,176,207
Panel B: Firms that change ownership
Private ownership -.005 -.003 -.002 -.004 -.005 -.004
(.009) (.009) (.009) (.009) (.007) (.007)
Adjusted R2 .753 .758 .859 .864 .598 .601
Observations 5,948 5,946 5,948
Industry trends no yes no yes no yes
Notes: Signicance levels:  : 10%  : 5%    : 1%. Each column
reports the coe¢ cient for private ownership obtained separately in a regression for
each dependent variable. Private ownership is an indicator variable that equals
one if the rm has at least 50 percent private ownership. All columns control for
four wage bargaining regimes and include rm, year, industry and region xed
e¤ects. Standard errors are clustered by rm.
The absence of any signicant e¤ect of privatization on skill composition is interesting
in relation to a recent empirical study by Chong et al. (2011), who use survey data to
analyse the e¤ect of pre-privatization labor policies on privatization prices. They nd a
negative e¤ect of voluntary retrenchment programs on net privatization prices and suggest
that this could be due to adverse selection where mostly high-skilled workers (with higher
outside options) tend to leave the rm, leading to a deterioration of the rms labor stock
with a corresponding drop in the privatization price. However, this mechanism cannot be
directly veried due to a lack of data on worker attributes. Although the purpose and
focus of our study are clearly di¤erent, the richness of our data in terms of workforce
attributes potentially allows for a more direct verication of such a mechanism. However,
we nd no evidence of any skill deterioration during the privatization process.
For robustness, we check if our results are sensitive to the denition of private owner-
ship. Thus far, we have used the threshold of 50% of private capital to determine whether
the rm is privately- or state-owned. It might be argued, however, that the process of
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corporate restructuring induced by the shift in ownership begins even before this threshold
is reached. We therefore dene a date of ownership change and use this instead of the
threshold level of private capital for dening private ownership. We follow the standard
approach in the literature (see, e.g., Megginson et al., 1994) of dening the privatization
(nationalization) date as the date of the rst transfer of property rights from public (pri-
vate) to private (public) hands for rms that eventually cross the threshold level of 50% of
private capital. Reassuringly, the results (reported in Appendix B) are qualitatively and
quantitatively very similar.
5.2 Fixed-e¤ects estimates on the matched sample
We now turn to the details of the matching procedure we adopt. Table 6 reports the
estimates yielded by the logit selection equation. As mentioned above, selection into
privatization may be driven by lagged rm attributes that could be correlated with the in-
dicators of corporate restructuring we use. As potential drivers of such selection processes,
we consider lagged vales of sales, labor productivity, monthly wages and real sales growth.
As is standard, we also include the variable year, to account for the dynamics of the pri-
vatization program. It is important to note that the inclusion of these lagged variables
implies that we loose a signicant number of rms. In particular, those rms that were
privatized in the beginning of the sample period (1991 and 1992) and those that have
missing values for some of these variables. The nal sample employed in this analysis
comprises 145 privatized rms. The results of the logit selection equation provide support
for the concern that selection into privatization is indeed non-random, with evidence that
smaller and more productive rms are more likely to be privatized.
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Table 6. Logit model for propensity score estimation
Private ownership
Lag sales (log) -.454
(.085)
Lag labor productivity (log) .531
(.110)
Lag monthly wage (log) .243
(.235)
Lag real sales growth .001
(.001)
Year -.208
(.031)
Industry dummies yes
Observations 1,191
Notes: Signicance levels:  : 10%  : 5%    : 1%.
Private ownership is an indicator variable that equals one if the
rm has at least 50 percent private ownership. Standard errors
clustered by rm.
We then implement the matching procedure, following the strategy laid out above.
Table C.1 in the appendix provides a set of standard tests of matching quality. Panel
A reports inference output of t-tests comparing the treated and control groups (actually
assigned by the matching procedure), and indicates that there is no statistically signicant
di¤erence in the means of all variables included in the selection equation between treatment
and control groups. Panel B shows that the selection model estimated on the matched
sample has a lower and statistically insignicant explanatory power, as expected, since the
treated and control groups are equal in the observable characteristics used in the selection
model. Panel C reports the output of a Hotelling T 2 test of the joint null of equal means
of all variables. This test is applied to the treatment and controls groups and reveals that
the hypothesis that vectors of means are equal for the two groups cannot be rejected.
14
Table 7. Results from matching di¤erence-in-di¤erences
Total Number of Establishment
employment (log) establishments (log) size (log)
(1) (2) (3)
Private ownership -.132 -.067 -.065
(.045) (.035) (.041)
Adjusted R2 .917 .924 .855
Observations 2,940 2,940 2,940
Entry rate Exit rate
(4) (5)
Private ownership -.003 .009
(.007) (.012)
Adjusted R2 .412 .482
Observations 2,940 2,940
Tenure (log) Age (log) Share of males
(6) (7) (8)
Private ownership -.030 -.009 .002
(.026) (.005) (.008)
Adjusted R2 .823 .721 .834
Observations 2,881 2,2940 2,940
Schooling > 12 Schooling Share of
years (log) skilled workers
(9) (10) (11)
Private ownership .010 -.004 -.004
(.010) (.010) (.008)
Adjusted R2 .803 .849 .674
Observations 2,940 2,939 2,940
Notes: Signicance levels:  : 10%  : 5%  : 1%. Each column reports the coe¢ cient for
private ownership obtained separately in a regression for each dependent variable. Private ownership
is an indicator variable that equals one if the rm has at least 50 percent private ownership. All
columns control for four wage bargaining regimes and include rm, year, industry and region xed
e¤ects. Bootstrapped standard errors, 300 replications.
Given the evidence supporting the validity of the research design, we now turn to the
estimates of the causal e¤ects of privatization on the outcomes considered earlier. Table
7 reports the xed-e¤ects estimates based on the matched sample. The results are, in
general, fairly similar to those reported above: privatization induces sizable job losses,
reecting in part a reduction in the number of establishments. The remaining estimates
remain qualitatively similar, although some impacts are somewhat less precisely estimated.
Since the implementation of the matching procedure entails a signicant drop in sample
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size, we should nevertheless remain cautious in drawing strong conclusions about such
insignicant results.
6 A theoretical discussion
We can explain our main empirical result the negative employment e¤ect of privatization
by using a theoretical framework similar to Monteiro et al. (2011) and Bastos et al.
(2011), where privatization is modelled as having potentially two di¤erent e¤ects: increased
prot orientation and less job security (leading to higher worker e¤ort).
Consider a single rm with a production function
y = eL; (2)
where L is the number of labor units used and and e is e¤ort per labor unit. Assuming that
the rm faces a downward-sloping demand curve, given by the inverse demand function
p (y), the prots of the rm are
 = p (y) y   wL; (3)
where w is the wage rate per unit of labor.9 Allowing for rm objectives that di¤er from
pure prot maximization, the objective function of the rm is assumed to be

 =  + S; (4)
where
S =
Z y
0
(p (x)  p (y)) dx (5)
is consumers surplus and  > 0 is the weight attached to consumers surplus in the
objective function of the rm. Choosing L to maximize 
, the optimal employment level
chosen by the rm is implicitly given by
(1  ) p0 (y) y + p (y) = !; (6)
9We assume here that the wage level is exogenously given. However, the employment e¤ects of privati-
zation in this theoretical framework are qualitatively similar if we endogenise wages by assuming that they
are decided in bargaining between the rm and a trade union, as in Monteiro et al. (2011), or that they
are a result of rm-specic fair wagepolicies, as in Bastos et al. (2011). Empirical results from additional
regressions (not reported but available upon request) show that our ndings hold when controlling for
wages.
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where ! := we is the e¤ective wage rate.
10 From (6) we can derive how increased prot
orientation or less job security a¤ects the optimal employment level.
Totally di¤erentiating (6), the e¤ect of increased prot orientation (i.e., a reduction in
) on optimal employment is given by
@L
@
=
p0 (y)L
(1  ) (p00 (y) y + p0 (y)) + p0 (y) < 0: (7)
This is quite intuitive. All else equal, a higher consideration for consumerssurplus implies
operating at a higher level of output, with a correspondingly lower price. Consequently,
if privatization implies a change in rm objectives towards more prot-orientation, the
rm will optimally reduce output in order to achieve a higher market price and thereby
increase prots. All else equal, this implies a downsizing of the labor force.
The other postulated e¤ect of privatization is a reduction of job security.11 Applying
a standard e¢ ciency wage argument, we assume that worker e¤ort depends negatively on
the degree of job security.12 Consequently, following this line of reasoning, privatization
is likely to lead to higher worker e¤ort. How does this a¤ect employment? Totally di¤er-
entiating (6) with respect to L and e, this particular e¤ect of privatization is (after some
algebraic manipulations) analytically given by
@L
@e
=
L
e
(   1) ; (8)
where
 :=  @L
@w
w
L
=
 !
y [(1  ) (p00 (y) y + p0 (y)) + p0 (y)] (9)
is the wage elasticity of labor demand. Thus, higher worker e¤ort leads to lower employ-
ment if labor demand is su¢ ciently inelastic ( < 1), and higher employment otherwise
( > 1). This ambiguity is the result of two counteracting e¤ects. On the one hand, higher
worker e¤ort reduces the e¤ective wage rate (!), which tends to increase labor demand.
10The second-order condition is given by
e2

(1  )  p00 (y) y + p0 (y)+ p0 (y) < 0;
which requires that the demand function is not too convex.
11 In most countries (including Portugal), workers in public rms are subject to specic employment
regulations which, due to more restrictive dismissal rules, allow them to enjoy a higher degree of job
security than private sector workers (see, e.g., Friebel and Magnac, 2007; OECD, 2008; Viana, 2007, pp.
11-12).
12See Bastos et al. (2011) for a more thorough discussion of this assumption with references to empirical
evidence.
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On the other hand, higher e¤ort means that a given output can be produced with fewer
workers, which tends to reduce the demand for labor. The relative strength of these two
e¤ects depends on the wage elasticity of labor demand. If demand is inelastic ( < 1),
a reduction in the e¤ective wage rate leads to a less-than-proportional increase in the
demand for e¤ective labor units. Thus, the rm does not need the entire existing labor
force (which is now more productive due to higher e¤ort) in order to meet the increased
demand for e¤ective labor units, causing total employment to drop.13
From (9) we see that the degree of prot orientation (inversely measured by ) generally
a¤ects the wage elasticity of labor demand, which complicates the relationship between
worker e¤ort and employment if privatization leads to both higher prot orientation and
higher worker e¤ort. These general relationships are greatly simplied if we consider the
special case of linear demand. Assuming that the inverse demand function is given by
p = a  by, the optimal level of employment is given by
L =
a  !
 (2b  ) : (10)
It is relatively straightforward to show that the wage elasticity of labor demand (at the
optimal employment level) is given by
 =
!
a  ! (11)
and does not depend on the degree of prot orientation. The condition  < 1 translates
into ! < a2 , implying that higher worker e¤ort will reduce employment if the e¤ective wage
rate is su¢ ciently low to begin with.
Summing up, it is theoretically possible to explain the negative relationship between
privatization and employment both as a result of increased prot orientation and as a
result of less job security. However, besides the underlying assumption of a negative
relationship between job security and worker e¤ort, the latter explanation also requires
that labor demand is su¢ ciently inelastic.
7 Conclusion
We have examined corporate restructuring following privatization using unusually rich
data covering the population of Portuguese rms over the period 1991-2009, when the
13These insights are not novel, and the relationship between worker productivity and labor demand,
given by (8), was rst shown by Dowrick and Spencer (1994). See also Lommerud et al. (2006) for further
analysis and discussion.
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country adopted one of the most ambitious privatization programs in the OECD. We have
provided evidence that a shift from public to private ownership leads to sizable job losses,
reecting both a reduction in the number of establishments and less employees per estab-
lishment. Perhaps surprisingly, our estimates provide no robust evidence that privatization
inuences the structure of the workforce, as measured by a variety of indicators.
To help interpret our main empirical nding that privatization leads to sizable job
losses  we have presented a theoretical model in which the ownership shift increases
the degree of prot orientation and reduces the degree of job security. Greater prot
orientation leads, all else equal, to an unambiguous reduction in employment levels. Less
job security can have a similar impact, but only if labor demand is su¢ ciently inelastic.
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Appendix A: Denition of skill groups
In the econometric analysis, we include a group of dummy variables to control for the skill
level associated with the workers occupation, as dened in the ISCO-88 classication.
Table A.1 presents the denition of skill groups.
Table A.1. Description of ISCO skills
Skill Description ISCO Major group
Skill level 1 Competence associated with general
education usually acquired by com-
pletion of compulsory education.
(9) Elementary occupations
Skill level 2 Requires knowledge as for rst skill
level, but typically a longer period of
worker-related training or work ex-
perience.
(4) Clerks; (5) Service workers and
shop and market sales workers; (6)
Skilled agriculture and shery; (7)
Craft and related workers; (8) Plant
and machine operators and assem-
blers
Skill level 3 Requires a body of knowledge as-
sociated with a period of post-
compulsory education but not to de-
gree level.
(3) Technicians and associate pro-
fessionals
Skill level 4 Normally requires a degree or an
equivalent period of relevant work
experience.
(1) Legislators, senior o¢ cials and
managers; (2) Professionals
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Appendix B: Alternative denition of private ownership
In this appendix we report xed-e¤ects estimates analogous to those presented in Tables
2 5, but based on an alternative denition of private ownership. In particular, we dene
a date of ownership change and use this date instead of the 50% threshold level of private
capital. Under this alternative denition, privatization (nationalization) coincides with
the rst transfer of property rights from public (private) to private (public) hands (for
rms that eventually cross the threshold level of 50% of private capital). Reassuringly,
the results reported in tables B.1-B.4 are qualitatively and quantitatively very similar.
Table B.1. Private ownership and size
Total Number of Establishment
employment (log) establishments (log) size (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: All rms
Private ownership -.198 -.220 -.094 -.099 -.104 -.121
(.058) (.056) (.037) (.037) (.041) (.040)
Adjusted R2 .872 .873 .748 .749 .857 .858
Observations 2,176,207 2,176,207 2,176,207
Panel B: Firms that change ownership
Private ownership -.135 -.114 -.054 -.044 -.082 -.070
(.044) (.043) (.026) (.027) (.039) (.036)
Adjusted R2 .899 .905 .892 .897 .859 .864
Observations 5,948 5,948 5,948
Industry trends no yes no yes no yes
Notes: Signicance levels:  : 10%  : 5%    : 1%. Each column reports the coe¢ cient
for private ownership obtained separately in a regression for each dependent variable. Private
ownership is an indicator variable that equals one when the rst transfer of property rights from
public to private hands occurs for rms that eventually reach at least 50 percent private ownership.
All columns control for four wage bargaining regimes and include rm, year, industry and region
xed e¤ects. Standard errors are clustered by rm.
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Table B.2. Private ownership and worker ows
Entry rate Exit rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: All rms
Private ownership .002 .004 .012 .011
(.005) (.006) (.006) (.006)
Adjusted R2 .258 .259 .336 .337
Observations 2,176,207 2,176,207
Panel B: Firms that change ownership
Private ownership -.004 -.004 .013 .012
(.006) (.006) (.007) (.006)
Adjusted R2 .204 .206 .421 .423
Observations 5,948 5,948
Industry trends no yes no yes
Notes: Signicance levels:  : 10%  : 5%    :
1%. Each column reports the coe¢ cient for private ownership
obtained separately in a regression for each dependent variable.
Private ownership is an indicator variable that equals one if the
rm has at least 50 percent private ownership. All columns
control for four wage bargaining regimes and include rm, year,
industry and region xed e¤ects. Standard errors are clustered
by rm.
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Table B.3. Private ownership and worker attributes
Tenure (log) Age (log) Share of males
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: All rms
Private ownership -.152 -.155 -.021 -.018 .007 .008
(.036) (.036) (.007) (.006) (.009) (.009)
Adjusted R2 .719 .721 .681 .683 .807 .807
Observations 1,965,412 2,176,207 2,176,207
Panel B: Firms that change ownership
Private ownership -.096 -.086 -.0003 -.0005 -.002 .0003
(.036) (.036) (.006) (.006) (.009) (.010)
Adjusted R2 .777 .785 .713 .718 .783 .785
Observations 5,761 5,948 5,948
Industry trends no yes no yes no yes
Notes: Signicance levels:  : 10%  : 5%    : 1%. Each column reports
the coe¢ cient for private ownership obtained separately in a regression for each dependent
variable. Private ownership is an indicator variable that equals one if the rm has at least 50
percent private ownership. All columns control for four wage bargaining regimes and include
rm, year, industry and region xed e¤ects. Standard errors are clustered by rm.
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Table B.4. Private ownership and education
Schooling > 12 Schooling Share of
years (log) skilled workers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: All rms
Private ownership .016 .014 .013 .013 .007 .004
(.010) (.010) (.010) (.010) (.007) (.007)
Adjusted R2 .706 .708 .778 .779 .537 .540
Observations 2,176,207 2,169,419 2,176,207
Panel B: Firms that change ownership
Private ownership -.0002 .001 -.006 -.006 -.007 -.006
(.010) (.010) (.011) (.010) (.007) (.007)
Adjusted R2 .752 .758 .859 .864 .598 .602
Observations 5,948 5,946 5,948
Industry trends no yes no yes no yes
Notes: Signicance levels:  : 10%  : 5%    : 1%. Each column
reports the coe¢ cient for private ownership obtained separately in a regression for
each dependent variable. Private ownership is an indicator variable that equals
one if the rm has at least 50 percent private ownership. All columns control for
four wage bargaining regimes and include rm, year, industry and region xed
e¤ects. Standard errors are clustered by rm.
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Appendix C: Balancing tests
Table C.1 reports the tests of matching quality discussed in section 5.2.
Table C.1. Indicators of matching quality
Panel A: Standardized bias and t-test
Variables Mean Absolute bias t-test
Treated Control t p-value
Lag sales (log) 15.318 15.093 8.6 0.75 0.451
Lag labor productivity (log) 11.392 11.572 11.8 -0.90 0.367
Lag monthly wage (log) 7.157 7.142 2.7 0.24 0.813
Lag real sales growth 24.066 28.029 3.5 -0.23 0.820
Year 2000.3 2000.1 3.5 0.27 0.790
Industries
Food, beverages and tobacco 0.048 0.021 18.0 1.29 0.199
Wood, cork and paper 0.034 0.014 12.3 1.15 0.253
Non-metallic products 0.069 0.055 7.3 0.49 0.628
Metallic products 0.041 0.090 26.9 -1.66 0.097
Electricity, gas and water 0.110 0.090 6.9 0.59 0.559
Construction 0.021 0.014 4.9 0.45 0.653
Wholesale and retail trade 0.055 0.103 24.3 -1.52 0.129
Hotels and restaurants 0.055 0.021 17.6 1.54 0.125
Transport and storage 0.110 0.124 3.8 -0.36 0.716
Post and telecommunications 0.028 0.014 9.6 0.82 0.411
Financial intermediation 0.117 0.145 11.2 -0.69 0.488
Real estate and other 0.145 0.152 1.8 -0.16 0.869
Education 0.041 0.055 7.3 -0.55 0.585
Health and social work 0.048 0.028 9.5 0.92 0.358
Other social services 0.062 0.076 4.1 -0.46 0.644
Panel B: Pseudo R2 and test of joint signicance of regressors
Sample Pseudo R2 2 p-value
Unmatched 0.252 222.61 0.000
Matched 0.055 22.28 0.235
Panel C: Hotelling T 2 test
T 2 F -stat p-value Observations
22.475 1.050 0.404 290
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